Some Pictures Are Worth 2^(N)o Sentences by Varzi, Achille C.
1Some Pictures Are Worth 2À 0 Sentences
Philip Kitcher and Achille Varzi
Columbia University
(published in Philosophy, 75:3 (2000), 377–381)
According to the cliché, a picture is worth a thousand words. But this is a ca-
nard, for it vastly underestimates the expressive power of many pictures and
diagrams. Even a simple map, such as the bare outline of Manhattan Island ac-
companied by a pointer marking North (Fig.1), is worth a vast infinity of sen-
tences—including a vast infinity of useful true sentences. Here’s why.
Figure 1
Let’s first be clear about what the map is. The printed image of the Man-
hattan outline on the page before us is digital, consisting Seurat-style of a finite
number of dots. The map itself, however, is a geometrical object, with the conti-
nuity properties of the real line. It contains continuum many points, that is, at
least 2À 0.
Second, this map (like other maps) is associated with reading conventions
which all competent map users grasp. These conventions divide into two sorts:
one sort of conventions link the syntactic elements of the map to entities in na-
2ture; the other sort tell us how to connect the properties of the visual display
with properties of those entities. Thus, the map has a certain syntax and the
reading conventions fix its semantics.
By way of illustration, consider a map of the world in which political terri-
tories are indicated by colored regions. Such regions are syntactic elements of
the map, they stand for entities in the world (convention #1). Their colors are
properties of the visual display, and the relevant reading convention is that dif-
ferently colored regions correspond to territories with different political admini-
strations (convention #2). This is, literally, a denotation assignment of the sort
that is involved whenever syntactic elements are interpreted. The second con-
vention also decrees that other properties of the visual display are projected to
the corresponding territories. For example, if two regions overlap, so do the cor-
responding territories; if one region is next to another, then the corresponding
territories are adjacent; if one region is bigger than another, so are the corre-
sponding territories. Not all properties of regions, however, must be so pro-
jected. On old-fashioned maps, the British Commonwealth (or, in earlier days,
the British Empire) was colored pink;but only an incompetent map reader
would draw the conclusion that certain parts of the world, including Nigeria and
the Indian sub-continent, were uniformly pink.
As a second example, consider the familiar map of the London Under-
ground. The reading conventions for this map link various dots to stations
(Charing Cross, Oxford Circus, and so forth) and various lines on the map to
railway lines. These are conventions of the first sort. In addition, a competent
map user knows that if two dots on the map are connected by a line, then the
stations denoted are connected by a railway line, and the number of intermediate
stations is exactly the number of intermediate dots. These are reading conven-
tions of the second sort. But, as with the pink Commonwealth, there are certain
things we shouldn’t infer: the fact that the dot standing for Notting Hill Gate is
left of one standing for Marble Arch doesn’t entitle us to conclude that the for-
mer station is exactly due West of the latter. (Here, there’s an important con-
trast with the standard map of the Paris Métro.) In short, the map preserves the
topology of the London Underground but not other geometrical properties.
Back to the outline map of Manhattan. What are the reading conventions
for it? First, we have to decide on the syntactic elements. To this end, let a divi-
sion be any partition of the geometrical line into connected intervals. Then we
take as syntactic elements the elements of any division. Since the set of con-
nected intervals of the real line has cardinality 2À 0, it follows that there are that
many syntactic elements.
3Next we must say what these syntactic elements denote (reading convention
#1). The general answer is obvious: each element corresponds to a particular
piece of Manhattan’s shoreline, a boundary in the physical world, if you like.
Which boundary goes with which element? That’s a tricky matter. There is a
vagueness problem and there is a granularity problem. Maybe there’s a consen-
sus among cartographers about just which bit of nature counts as the shoreline,
and which bit of shoreline corresponds to which element. If so, then there’s
unique denotation. But maybe there are alternative ways to pick out the shore-
line, or to decide just where an interval of the outline on the map starts on it. If
so, then we’ll do best to think in terms of indeterminate reference: there is no
unique way of interpreting the map. These problems are not peculiar to maps,
however: they arise naturally also with regard to the semantics of ordinary lin-
guistic expressions, such as ‘the shoreline of Manhattan’ or ‘the area where
Martha lives’. We need not concern ourselves with such general problems here,
so we’ll simplify by supposing uniqueness.1
Finally, we must specify how to project the geometrical properties of the
display onto the world (reading convention #2). In the case we’ve chosen, this
is more straightforward than in our illustrative examples. If a syntactic element
has a particular curvature property, then the corresponding bit of shoreline must
also have that curvature property, assuming the map is accurate. If the line join-
ing the midpoints of two syntactic elements is at an angle q  o the North-South
axis, then the relative direction of two corresponding points on the shoreline has
to be q  from due North: so at least the map tells us. There is much more to it
than just topology.
It should now be clear why the map is worth 2À 0 sentences. Our point is
not that a picture is worth so much because it is not a linguistic entity but rather
because a map says a lot of things at once. For there are at least 2À 0 syntactic
elements, so obviously there are at least 2À 0 s ntences. These include 2À 0 logi-
cally true sentences of the form x= x, which do not correspond to any specific
content of the map (albeit they are, in a sense, part of what the map says). But
there are also 2À 0 true sentences which are peculiar to this map, and whose truth
is not a matter of logic. For there are at least 2À 0 g ometric properties and rela-
tions that we can project from the geometrical configuration with respect to each
of them (each pair of them, each triple of them, and so forth). Each such projec-
                                                
1 On the link between linguistic vagueness and geographic ontology see e.g. P. A. Bur-
rough and A. U. Frank (eds.), Geographic Objects with Indeterminate Boundaries, London:
Taylor & Francis, 1996.
4tion yields an interpreted sentence, and virtually all of these sentences are false.
(Sad to say, even given the most careful surveying, we can’t expect the cartog-
rapher to have the angles exactly right.) But some of these sentences—in fact as
many as 2À 0—are true; and among these are the ones that are most useful to us.
Let’s see why.
Take any two relatively small syntactic elements, say the closed intervals [a,
b] and [c, d] (Fig. 2). Consider all the lines joining any point in one to any point
in the other. These will form a band. Let the extremal angles to the North-South
axis be q –d  and q +d  respectively (Fig. 3). Consider now all statements of the
form “P1 is within f of q  East of North with respect to P2”, where the Pi are the
referents of the syntactic elements chosen. These statements are a pedantic way
of putting what we expect the map to tell us, to wit that one place on the shore-
line is, within a certain limit of error, in a particular compass direction from an-
other specified place. If the syntactic elements are small, then d will be small,
and, if the map meets ordinary standards of accuracy, all lines within the band
will fall within an interval of width f  around the direction marked out by q . So
the map will yield lots of true e ror-explicit direction statements. How many?
2À 0 of course. For there are at least that many pairs of small intervals along the
coastline. So the map includes 2À 0 true sentences of this sort, among which is
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5In conclusion we face two obvious objections. First: All this is too vague.
We are treating maps as syntactic objects that receive a semantic interpretation
via suitable reading conventions. But even a simple map requires a lot of spell-
ing out when it comes to identifying the relevant syntactic elements and the rele-
vant properties of the visual display. Indeed, we agree that providing a formal
semantics for real life maps (not to mention other pictures) is a difficult task.
But we are confronted with similar problems when it comes to the semantics of
ordinary language. In that case, one standard solution proceeds from the as-
sumption that each sentence of ordinary language corresponds to one or more
expression of a suitable formal language—expressions that exhibit a logical
form for the sentence and for which a rigorous semantics can be given. Like-
wise, one way to get clear about the semantics of maps is to proceed from the
assumption that each ordinary map corresponds to one or more idealized maps
for which the reading conventions are well defined.2 Our reference to the map
of Manhattan is to be understood in this way, which is why we can steer clear of
such problems such as granularity and vagueness. It is the logical form of that
map that involves 2À 0 true sentences.
Second objection: All this is cheating. By taking the map as an idealized
geometrical object we multiplied statements beyond necessity. Instead we
should have recognized either the digital character of the display or the limits of
human visual acuity. Now we don’t normally think of maps or other pictures as
thoroughly finite objects. If we did, we’d have to worry about whether different
tokens of the same type really did contain exactly the same number of points. If
the commercial printer has a higher resolution than ours are we unable to print
out the same map? We think not. But we are tolerant of different conceptions.
Allow then that the number of divisions isn’t 2À 0 but some vast finite number.
For each pair of small elements we can still derive from the map true error-
explicit direction statements. How many? Well, the error parameter f  can still
take continuum many values. So there are at least 2À 0 tru  contingent sentences
in the map. Not all the ones that we suggested earlier, to be sure, but still just as
many. Enough to show that the old cliché has sold pictures short.3
                                                
2 This is the idea behind the semantics for formal maps outlined in R. Casati and A. C.
Varzi, Parts and Places, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1999, ch. 11.
3 We would like to thank Laura Perini for many helpful conversations about the seman-
tics of maps and pictures. Perini’s own views are rather different from those expressed here,
and her innocence of our errors will be clear once her own research on the topic is published.
